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his article uses a simple model to review the economic theory of
efﬁcient redistributive taxation. Three main results are presented.
The ﬁrst is the classic competitive equilibrium efﬁciency result: trade
in competitive markets leads to an efﬁcient ﬁnal (i.e., equilibrium) allocation
of consumption among the agents in the economy. The equilibrium allocation
isdeterminedbymarketsupplyanddemandforces. Inourmodeleconomy,the
equilibrium allocation is determined uniquely. This efﬁciency result, known
as the FirstWelfareTheorem, provides a strong argument supporting the view
that unobstructed competitive market forces can be relied on to determine
the allocation of consumption in the economy. One must observe, however,
that the competitive market equilibrium supports one efﬁcient allocation, i.e.,
competitive markets support one particular distribution of the total gains from
trade that are available in the economy. There are an inﬁnite number of
ways in which the total gains from trade can be efﬁciently divided among
the agents. Thus, absent redistribution, almost all efﬁcient divisions of the
gains from trade are inconsistent with the competitive market mechanism. In
otherwords,thecompetitivemarketmechanismguaranteesefﬁciencybutalso
imposes on the society one particular division of the welfare gains from trade.
It is entirely possible that the agents in the economy may prefer to divide the
gains from trade differently. In fact, there is no a priori reason to believe that
the society’s most preferred division of the gains from trade should happen to
coincidewiththatimposedbythemarketmechanism. Thus, fordistributional
reasons, the competitive market allocation will almost surely be suboptimal.
The second result we review describes the classic solution to the distribu-
tional problems associated with the competitive market mechanism: wealth
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transfers. If society prefers a different division of the gains from trade than
the one brought about by competitive market forces, it is sufﬁcient to transfer
wealth among the agents in order to correct it. Such wealth transfers can
be implemented via simple lump-sum transfers and taxes levied by the gov-
ernment. This result, known as the Second Welfare Theorem, however, poses
strongrequirementsonthequalityofinformationavailabletothegovernment.
Lump-sum taxes, by deﬁnition, depend only on agents’types (and not on their
actions). In order to use lump-sum taxes, thus, the government must possess
sufﬁcient information about agents’ types, on a person-by-person basis. If
public information is not sufﬁciently detailed, the required wealth transfers
and taxes cannot be applied because the government is unable to determine
which agents should be taxed and which should receive a transfer. In this
situation, the Second Welfare Theorem breaks down: Lump-sum taxes are
insufﬁcient to achieve any division of the gains from trade other than the one
implied by the competitive market mechanism.
Thethirdresultwereviewconcernstheproblemofefﬁcientredistribution
of the total gains from trade in the case of incomplete public information.
Here, the inefﬁcacy of lump-sum taxes creates a role for distortionary taxa-
tion. A tax is called distortionary if the amount due from an agent depends on
his actions. If an activity is subject to a distortionary tax, then by avoiding the
activity the agent can avoid the tax, which distorts his incentive to engage in
this activity. The ability to inﬂuence agents’incentives is exactly what makes
distortionary taxes useful. The tax-imposed distortions can be designed to
offset the distortions resulting from incomplete information. Such corrective
distortions,clearly,cannotbegeneratedbylump-sumtaxes,whicharenondis-
tortionary. The third main result we review in this article is a version of the
Second Welfare Theorem modiﬁed to include distortionary taxes. Within our
model economy, we fully characterize a distortionary tax system sufﬁcient to
achieveanyefﬁcientdivisionofthegainsfromtradeavailableinoureconomy
when public information is incomplete. This tax system consists of a lump-
sum-funded subsidy to sufﬁciently large capital trades. Depending on which
among the inﬁnite number of efﬁcient divisions of the gains from trade is to
be implemented, the subsidy can go to either those who sell or to those who
buy capital in the competitive market.
Themodeleconomyisatwo-period, deterministicLucas-treeeconomyin
which income comes from a stock of productive capital. In each period, one
unit of the capital stock produces y units of a single, perishable consumption
good. The capital stock is ﬁxed, i.e., no physical investment is possible. The
size of the economy’s total capital stock is normalized to unity. Agents, who
own the capital stock in equal shares, are heterogenous with respect to their
preference for early versus late consumption. In particular, there are two
types of agents in this economy: the patient ones, whose marginal utility fromB. Grochulski: Redistributive Taxation 237
consuming in the ﬁrst period is relatively low, and the impatient ones, whose
marginal utility from consuming in the ﬁrst period is relatively high.
Efﬁcient divisions of the welfare gains from trade are represented by
Pareto-efﬁcient allocations of consumption. For the model economy we
consider, Pareto-efﬁcient allocations of consumption are characterized in
Grochulski (2008). This characterization describes the full set of possibil-
ities for feasible and efﬁcient division of the total gains from trade among the
patientandimpatientagents—bothinthecaseofcompletepublicinformation
and in the case of agents’private knowledge of their impatience type. Having
this description in hand, we can consider, in the present article, the question
of how any given such division can be implemented in a competitive market
economy. Inparticular, wefocusontherolethegovernmenthasinsupporting
the socially preferred division of total gains from trade through redistributive
taxation.
The question of efﬁcient redistribution and its implementation through
taxation has long been studied in economics. The deﬁnitive treatment of
the classical theory of efﬁciency and distributional properties of competitive
markets under full information and with no externalities is given in Debreu
(1959).1 The ﬁrst two of the three main results we review in this article are
simple special cases of the welfare theorems provided in Debreu (1959).2 In
a seminal paper, Mirrlees (1971) takes on the same question while explicitly
recognizing that government information may be incomplete. The third main
result we present is a version of the optimal distortionary taxation result of
Mirrlees (1971). Our model economy differs from that of Mirrlees (1971) in
that ours is a pure-capital-income, general equilibrium economy while in the
one studied in Mirrlees (1971) all income comes from labor. Mathematically,
however, our model economy is a simpliﬁed version of the model studied in
Mirrlees (1971).
Stiglitz (1987) reviews the literature on optimal redistributive taxation in
economies with private information.3 Kocherlakota (2007) surveys a related
literature on tax systems implementing optimal social insurance in dynamic
economies with ex-post private information.
The body of this article is organized as follows. Section 1 describes
in detail the economy we study. Section 2 deﬁnes competitive equilibrium.
Section 3 demonstrates the efﬁciency of competitive equilibrium indirectly
as well as through direct computation. Section 4 shows the sufﬁciency of
lump-sum taxes for efﬁcient redistribution under full information. Also, it
1 Pigou (1932) initiated the by now extensive, and still actively developing, literature on
corrective distortionary taxation in economies with externalities.
2 Chapter 16 of Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995) contains an excellent textbook treat-
ment of these results.
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demonstrates the inefﬁcacy of lump-sum taxes when agents’types are not ob-
served by the government. Section 5 deﬁnes a general class of distortionary
tax systems. There, also, it is shown that a simple tax system with a pro-
portional distortionary tax on capital income is incapable of providing any
redistribution. Section 6 is devoted to the study of an optimal distortionary
taxsysteminwhichcapitaltaxesarenonlinear. Section7discussesalternative
optimal tax systems. Section 8 concludes.
1. A SIMPLE PURE CAPITAL INCOME ECONOMY
In this article, we will study a private-ownership version of the economic
environmentalsostudiedinacompanionarticle,Grochulski(2008,referenced
hereafter as G08 for short). The economy is populated by a unit mass of
agents who live for two periods, t = 1,2. There is a single consumption good
each period, ct, and agents’ preferences over consumption pairs (c1,c 2) are
represented by the utility function
θu(c1) + βu(c2), (1)
where β is a common-to-all discount factor, and θ is an agent-speciﬁc pref-
erence parameter. Agents are heterogenous in their relative preference for
consumption at date 1. We assume a two-point support for the population
distribution of the impatience parameter, θ. Agents, therefore, are of two
types. A fraction, μH, of the agents are impatient with a strong preference for
consuming in period 1. Denote by H the value of the preference parameter, θ,
that represents preferences of the impatient agents. A fraction, μL = 1−μH,
are agents of the patient type. Their value of the impatience parameter, θ,
denoted by L, satisﬁes L<H.
The production side of the economy is represented by the so-called Lucas
tree. Eachagentisendowedwithoneunitofproductivecapitalstock—thetree.
Each period, one unit of the capital stock produces y units of the consumption
good—the fruit of the tree. Given that the total mass of agents is normalized
to unity and each agent is endowed with one tree, the aggregate amount of
the consumption good available in this economy in each of the two periods is
Y = y. The consumption good is perishable—it cannot be stored from period
1 to 2. The size of the capital stock, i.e., the number of trees, is ﬁxed: Capital
does not depreciate nor can it be accumulated.
Note that there is no uncertainty in this economy. In particular, agents’
impatienceparameter,θ,isnonstochastic. Theproductionsideoftheeconomy
is deterministic as well.
Forsimplicityandclarityofexposition,asinG08,wewillfocusouratten-
tiononaparticularsetofvaluesforthepreferenceandtechnologyparameters.B. Grochulski: Redistributive Taxation 239
In particular, we take














Roughly, the model period is thought of as being 25 years. The value of
the discount factor, β,o f1
2 corresponds to an annualized discount factor of
about0.973. Thefractionsofthetwopatiencetypesareequal; preferencesare
logarithmic. Theper-periodproductofthecapitalstock,y = Y,isnormalized
to 1.
An allocation in this economy is a description of how the total output
(i.e., the total capital income, Y) is distributed among the agents each period.
An allocation, therefore, is given by c = (c1H,c 1L,c 2H,c 2L), where ctθ ≥ 0
denotestheamountoftheconsumptiongoodinperiodt assignedtoeachagent
of type θ. To be resource-feasible, allocations must satisfy
 
θ=H,L
μθctθ ≤ Y, (3)
for t = 1,2, i.e., the aggregate consumption must not exceed the aggregate
output.4 Given the utility functions (1), an allocation, c, gives total utility
(or welfare), θu(c1θ) + βu(c2θ), to each agent of type θ = H,L. For any
α ∈ [0,1], the social welfare function is a weighted average of the utilities of
the two types of agents:
α [Hu(c1H) + βu(c2H)] + (1 − α)[Lu(c1L) + βu(c2L)], (4)
where α represents the absolute weight the society attaches to the welfare
of the agents of type H. Let γ = α/(1 − α) denote the relative weight of
the agents of type H. An allocation is Pareto efﬁcient if there does not exist
a feasible re-allocation that some agents would desire and no agents would
oppose. Inthissense, Pareto-efﬁcientallocationsrepresentalldivisionsofthe
total gains from trade that can be attained in the economy.
As discussed in G08, one can ﬁnd all Pareto-efﬁcient allocations by solv-
ing, for each γ ∈ [0,+∞], the problem of maximization of the social welfare
function (4) subject to feasibility constraints. If all information in the econ-
omy is public, these feasibility constraints are simply the resource feasibility
constraints(3). Theallocation, c, attainingthemaximumofthesocialwelfare
function (4) for a given value of the relative weight, γ, is called a First Best
Paretooptimum, andisdenotedbyc∗(γ). Byadjustingγ between0and+∞,
we can trace out the set of all First Best Pareto optima in this economy. This
set is depicted in Figure 1 of G08.
The assumption of complete public information may be too strong. In
particular, the government may be unable to observe agents’preferences. For
4 Note that this constraint is independent of how the aggregate output is initially allocated
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this reason, we will consider the assumption that each agent’s impatience pa-
rameter, θ, is known only to the agent himself and not to anybody else in
the economy. This incompleteness of public information imposes additional
restrictionsonthefeasiblere-allocationsthatcanbeimplementedintheecon-
omy. As discussed in G08, these restrictions take the form of the so-called
incentive compatibility constraints, which are given by
Hu(c1H) + βu(c2H) ≥ Hu(c1L) + βu(c2L) and (5)
Lu(c1L) + βu(c2L) ≥ Lu(c1H) + βu(c2H). (6)
Suppose the government presents the agents with an allocation, c, and asks
them to reveal their impatience parameter. If c satisﬁes these constraints, the
agents will have no incentive to misrepresent their true type.
In the economy with private information, all Pareto-efﬁcient allocations
can be found by maximizing, again for each γ ∈ [0,+∞], the social welfare
function (4) subject to resource feasibility constraints (3) and the incentive
compatibilityconstraints(5)and(6). Theallocation,c,attainingthemaximum
in this problem for a given value of γ is denoted by c∗∗(γ) and often called
a constrained-Pareto or Second Best Pareto optimum. This name reﬂects the
fact that c∗∗(γ) is efﬁcient in a more narrow sense than the corresponding
c∗(γ),a sc∗∗(γ) is constrained by private information while c∗(γ) is not. The
set of all Second Best Pareto optima for this economy is depicted in Figure 4
of G08.
G08 provides a fairly detailed characterization of the sets of First and
Second Best Pareto-optimal allocations. In the present article, we will exam-
ine the relation between Pareto-optimal allocations and market equilibrium
allocations. We begin by describing the competitive market mechanism and
its equilibrium.
2. COMPETITIVE CAPITAL MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
In this article, we study a private-ownership economy in which all agents are
initially endowed with one unit of productive capital. Relative to this initial
allocation, clearly, there are gains from trade to be exploited (i.e., the initial
allocation is not a Pareto optimum). When income generated by the capital
stock (i.e., the dividend) is realized in the ﬁrst period, all agents have the same
amount of the consumption good in hand (y units), and the same amount of
consumption they will receive in the next period (y units again), but not the
same desire to consume now versus next period. Thus, it is natural for them
to trade consumption in hand today for capital, i.e., for the dividends, that
will be received tomorrow. The relatively impatient agents, i.e., those whose
preference type is θ = H, can sell some of their capital to the more patient
agents of type θ = L in return for current consumption. This can be done for
the mutual beneﬁt of the two types of agents because their preferences differ.B. Grochulski: Redistributive Taxation 241
The terms of this mutually beneﬁcial trade, which will determine the ﬁnal
division of the welfare gains from trade, can depend on many factors. How
many units of consumption in the ﬁrst period will a patient agent be willing to
payforaunitofcapitalbeingsoldbytheimpatientagent? Giventheeconomic
environment, a reasonable answer to this question is: the market price. In this
environment, we have a large number of sellers of capital (mass mH to be
exact) and a large number of buyers (mass mL). Also, we do not assume
that buyers or sellers face any technological barriers to trading like signiﬁcant
costs of shopping around, communicating, or negotiating with potential trade
counterparties. Therefore, no rational agent will trade with a counterparty
unless he is conﬁdent that he cannot obtain more favorable terms of trade by
continuing to shop around. The competitive market price of capital represents
the terms of trade that give this conﬁdence to a rational agent. It is reasonable
toexpectthatacompetitivemarketforcapitalwillemergeinthisenvironment.
Let us therefore consider the standard formal model of the competitive
marketmechanism. Afteragentscollectdividendsinperiod1,theychoosethe
quantity, c1, that they consume now, the quantity, a, of capital they purchase
or sell at the market price, q, and the quantity they will be consuming in
the second period, c2. Their initial endowment of capital and its price, q,
determine the set of consumption pairs (c1,c 2) that are affordable.
Formally, agents of type θ = H,Lchoose c1, a, and c2 so as to solve the




subject to the budget constraints
c1 + qa ≤ y, (7)
c2 ≤ (1 + a)y. (8)
Note that the non-negativity requirement for consumption at the second date




θ (q)forθ = H,Ldenotetheagents’demand
functions for consumption and capital, respectively, i.e., the solutions to the
above individual optimization problem for any given price of capital, q.
Deﬁnition 1 Competitive market equilibrium consists of a consumption allo-
cation, ˆ c = (ˆ c1H, ˆ c1L, ˆ c2H, ˆ c2L); capital trades, ˆ a = (ˆ aH, ˆ aL); and a capital
price, ˆ q, such that
(i) agents optimize, i.e., the equilibrium allocation maximizes agents’
utility given the equilibrium price, ˆ q:
ˆ ctθ = cD
tθ(ˆ q),
ˆ aθ = aD
θ (ˆ q),
for t = 1,2 and θ = H,L;242 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
(ii) the capital market clears:
 
θ=H,L
μθ ˆ aθ = 0. (9)
Note that the budget constraints and the capital market clearing condition
implythattheequilibriumallocationofconsumptionisresource-feasible, i.e.,
the sum of all agents’ consumption in every period does not exceed the total
amount of output, Y:
 
θ=H,L
μθ ˆ ctθ ≤ Y (10)
for t = 1,2.
3. EFFICIENCY OF CAPITAL MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
Suppose there is no government intervention and agents trade freely. As
a result, each agent obtains some ﬁnal allocation of consumption. As we
discussedintheprevioussection, weexpectthisallocationtobeacompetitive
equilibrium allocation, ˆ c. The following is the classic competitive market
optimality result.
Theorem 1 Let (ˆ c, ˆ a, ˆ q)be a competitive capital market equilibrium. Then,
the equilibrium allocation of consumption, ˆ c, is Pareto optimal.
Recall that an allocation is Pareto optimal (or Pareto efﬁcient) if it is
feasibleandnotParetodominatedbyanotherfeasibleallocation. Anallocation
x Pareto dominates an allocation z if all agents in the economy prefer x over
z, and at least one agent in the economy prefers x over z strictly.5 Clearly,
a Pareto-dominated allocation is a waste. If all agents can be made better
off including at least one agent strictly, it would be a waste to not exploit
this opportunity. The above theorem tells us that competitive equilibrium
allocation is free of this failure. This important result, which holds much
more generally than just in our simple capital market model, is often called
the First Welfare Theorem.
A General Proof of the First Welfare Theorem
In this subsection, let us present a general, standard argument behind the First
Welfare Theorem.6 We will note that this argument is an indirect one.
5 G08 provides additional discussion of Pareto dominance and feasibility with full and partial
public information.
6 See also Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995) for an excellent textbook treatment of
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We begin with the following simple implication of agents’ utility maxi-
mization: In equilibrium, it must be the case that
ˆ c1θ +ˆ c2θ ˆ q/y = y +ˆ q. (11)
To see this, note ﬁrst that when agents optimize, their budget constraints will
be satisﬁed as equalities because utility is strictly increasing in consumption.
Then, eliminate ˆ aθ from (7) and (8) to obtain (11).
Equation (11) represents the fact that in equilibrium agents will not waste
personal wealth. The right-hand side of (11) represents the equilibrium value
of each agent’s initial endowment of capital in terms of the units of ﬁrst-
period consumption. In period 1, an agent can collect dividend y and then
sell all his capital endowment for ˆ q. Thus, his total wealth is y +ˆ q. The
left-hand side of (11) represents the cost of the consumption allocation, ˆ cθ.
In equilibrium,
ˆ q
y is the price of one unit of c2 in terms of the units of c1:I t
takes 1
y units of capital to obtain one unit of consumption in period 2, and q
units of consumption in period 1 to obtain one unit of capital. Effectively, it
takes
ˆ q
y units of consumption c1 to obtain one unit of consumption c2. Thus,
ˆ c1θ +ˆ c2θ ˆ q/y is the cost of the consumption pair ˆ cθ = (ˆ c1θ, ˆ c2θ).
Nowsupposethatafeasibleallocation ¯ c Paretodominatestheequilibrium
allocation ˆ c. This means that agents of at least one type strictly prefer ¯ cθ over
ˆ cθ, and both types prefer ¯ cθ over ˆ cθ at least weakly. Because utility is strictly
increasing in consumption, ¯ cθ must be strictly unaffordable to all those who
strictlypreferitandatbestjustaffordabletothosewhoweaklypreferit(which
is everybody).7 Thus, for both θ,
¯ c1θ +¯ c2θ ˆ q/y ≥ˆ y + q (12)
with at least one of these two inequalities being strict. Multiplying this in-
equality for type θ by μθ and adding over θ , we obtain
 
θ=H,L










where the inequality is strict because at least one of the inequalities in (12) is
strict. Since ¯ c is feasible, it must satisfy the resource constraints (10). Using
these, we obtain from the above that
Y + Y ˆ q/y > y +ˆ q.
7 Note that this argument relies only on the strict monotonicity of preferences (and, in fact,
could rely only on local nonsatiation; see Mas-Collel, Whinston, and Green [1995], section 16
C). In our model, we could actually make a stronger argument based on the strict convexity of
preferences. Namely, since agents’ preferences are strictly increasing and strictly convex, ˆ cθ is a
unique maximizer of utility in the budget set. Thus, ¯ cθ must be strictly unaffordable even to the
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Substituting Y = y we get
Y +ˆ q>Y+ˆ q,
which is a contradiction. Thus, a feasible allocation, ¯ c, that Pareto dominates
the equilibrium allocation, ˆ c, cannot exist.
A Direct Proof of the First Welfare Theorem
The First Welfare Theorem tells us that any equilibrium allocation is Pareto
optimal and nothing more. In particular, the general, indirect proof of the
FirstWelfareTheoremtellsusnothingaboutwhichamongtheinﬁnitelymany
Pareto-optimal allocations the equilibrium allocation ˆ c coincides with. This
question, which strictly speaking is outside the scope of the First Welfare
Theorem, may be of independent interest.
In the speciﬁc environment that we consider in this article, we can give a
direct proof of the First Welfare Theorem. Namely, we can compute the set
of competitive equilibrium allocations and compare it against the set of all
Pareto-optimal allocations. In this way, we will be able to tell exactly which
Pareto optima can be implemented as competitive equilibria.
Solving the individual utility maximization problem
We begin by deriving the agents’ capital demand functions. Similar to (11),
we can rewrite the agents’ budget constraints as an equality of the present
value of consumption and wealth:
c1 + c2q/y = y + q. (13)
In this form, it is easy to see the agents’ utility maximization problem has a
linearbudgetsetandastrictlyconcaveobjectivefunction. Thus, ateachprice,
q, it has a unique solution, which we can compute from the budget constraint
(13) and the Euler equation8
θu (c1)q/y = βu (c2). (14)
For each θ, we solve these two equations to obtain consumption demand
functionscD














8 Perhaps the simplest way to obtain the Euler equation (14) is to express the utility maxi-










Solving for equilibrium price of capital and allocation
Substituting the capital demand functions into the capital market clearing
condition (9) and solving for the price that clears this market, we obtain an
equilibrium price ˆ q = 1
2. It is easy to see that there are no other prices that
clear this market, i.e., the competitive equilibrium is unique in our model.9
We can now compute equilibrium capital trades:
















and the equilibrium allocation of consumption:
ˆ cL =
 
























Figure 1 depicts the agents’ budget constraint at the equilibrium capital
price, ˆ q = 1
2; equilibrium consumption pairs (15) and (16); and one indiffer-
ence curve for each type of agent. Clearly, both agent types face the same
budget constraint. Since their preferences differ, so do their choices. The in-
difference curve depicted for each type θ represents the highest level of utility
that each type attains within the budget constraint. Note also that point (1,1)
in Figure 1 represents the consumption bundle that agents get if they do not
trade. In equilibrium, the impatient agent exchanges 1
4 units of c1 for 1
2 units
of c2. The patient agent, of course, takes the opposite end of this trade.
Confronting equilibrium with the set of Pareto-optimal
allocations
Our ﬁrst observation here is that the competitive capital market mechanism
deliversauniqueequilibriumallocationofconsumption. Weobservenextthat,
as shown in detail in G08, there is a continuum of Pareto-optimal allocations
9 Expressed as a function of gross return on capital investment, R = 1
q , rather than the price
of capital, q, agents’ demand for capital is linear in R. Namely, aD
θ (R) = R+1
1+2θ − 1. Thus, for
any two numbers, θ, there can be at most one solution to the capital market clearing condition,
so equilibrium is unique.246 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly










in our environment.10 From these two observations, we immediately see
that almost all Pareto-optimal allocations are incompatible with competitive
equilibrium.
Which one among the continuum is the Pareto optimum consistent with
competitive equilibrium? Formulas (8)–(11) in G08 describe the set of all
First Best Pareto optima indexed by parameter γ ∈ [0,∞] representing the
relative welfare weight assigned to the impatient agents in the social objective
function. Ifsocietyfavorsneitherofthetwotypesofagents,thewelfareweight
given to both types is the same, i.e., the relative weight of the impatient type,
γ, is 1. Thus, γ = 1 represents the so-called utilitarian Pareto optimum.
By γ CE let us denote the value of the index, γ, associated with the optimum
that is selected by the market mechanism in competitive equilibrium. From
10 Multiplicity of Pareto-optimal allocations is typical in environments with heterogenous
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formulas (8)–(11) in G08, we obtain immediately that the unique competitive
allocation, ˆ c, given in (15) and (16) is the Pareto optimum corresponding to
γ = 1/3, i.e., γ CE = 1/3 in our economy. Thus, competitive equilibrium is
optimal if and only if society values welfare of the patient type, L, three times
as much as it values welfare of the impatient type, H.
Why this Pareto Optimum?
As we have seen, competitive capital market equilibrium implements a rather
particular Pareto optimum. Intuitively, we see that the competitive capital
market selects a Pareto optimum that “favors” the patient agents. With a large
mass of agents whose desire for consumption in the ﬁrst period is very strong
relativetothepopulationaverage(H exceedstheaverageθ by66percent),the
marketis“ﬂooded”withcapital, whichbecomesveryaffordabletothepatient
agents.11 As the impatient agents compete for ﬁrst-period consumption, the
patientagentsendupreceivingtwounitsofc2foreachunitofc1inequilibrium.
That rate of exchange is optimal only if society on the whole cares for the
welfareofthepatientagentsmorethanitcaresforthewelfareoftheimpatient
consumers.12
In conclusion, the competitive market mechanism does two things: it
allows the agents to obtain welfare gains from trade, and it also divides these
gains among the agents in a particular way. It is entirely possible that society
might desire a different division of the welfare gains than the one built into
the competitive market allocation mechanism. This problem creates a role for
redistributive government policy. In the remainder of this article, we consider
how the government can supplement the competitive market mechanism with
a tax system that preserves efﬁciency but implements other divisions of the
welfare gains from trade.
In the next section, we consider the situation in which the government has
full information on each agent’s preference type and, therefore, can transfer
wealth from one type to another as a lump sum. Subsequently, we consider
11 To see this point more clearly, note that the preferences of the patient type can be alter-
natively represented by log(c1) + log(c2) and ˆ q = 1
2.
12As a simple thought experiment, consider the question of how the competitive equilibrium
selection from the Pareto set changes when the relative impatience of the two types of agents
changes. In particular, suppose that L is not necessarily 1
2 but can be any real number smaller
or equal to H. Let γCE(L) denote the index of the Pareto optimum that is implemented by the
competitive equilibrium as L is adjusted between 0 and 5
2. It is easy to show that γCE(L) =
(2L+1)/6. Thus, competitive equilibrium selects the utilitarian Pareto optimum only if all agents
are identical (no trade is optimal in this case). When the impatient agents become very impatient,
i.e., when L approaches 0, we have that γCE(0) = 1
6, i.e., competitive equilibrium selects the
Pareto optimum that would be selected by a society that values welfare of the patient type L six
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private information, which makes lump-sum wealth transfers infeasible and
creates a role for distortionary redistributive taxation.
4. COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM WITH LUMP-SUM TAXES
We begin by extending the deﬁnition of competitive equilibrium (i.e., Deﬁni-
tion 1) to allow for lump-sum wealth transfers. A tax on an agent is lump-sum
if the amount due is independent of any choices made by this agent. For ex-
ample, a labor income tax is not lump-sum because the amount due increases
with the number of hours the agent chooses to work. Taxes under which the
amount due does depend on the taxpayers’choices are called distortionary.
In our economy, agents choose consumption in periods 1 and 2 and their
capital holdings in period 2. Thus, lump-sum taxes must not depend on con-
sumption or capital holdings. Agents’impatience type θ, however, is not their
choice. If the government can observe each agent’s type θ, a lump-sum tax
can depend on θ. In this section, we assume that each agent’s preference type
θ is freely and publicly observable. In particular, the government sees every
agent’s type and therefore can impose different lump-sum taxes on the agents
of different types.
In this setting, a lump-sum tax system consists of two real numbers: TH
and TL, where a negative value of Tθ means a transfer from the government
to the agent of type θ. Under these taxes, the budget constraints of the agents
of type θ = H,Lare
c1 + aq ≤ y − Tθ,
c2 ≤ (1 + a)y,
where q, as before, is the ex-dividend price of capital in the ﬁrst period. Note
that the lump-sum taxes Tθ are levied in period 1 and denominated in the units
of consumption at that date. It is entirely possible to levy lump-sum taxes at
both dates, but it is easy to see that doing this would not be useful. Treating
the budget constraints as equalities, eliminating a, we can express the budget
constraint in the present value as follows:
c1 + c2q/y = y + q − Tθ. (17)
From here we see that any lump-sum tax at the second date can be lumped
into Tθ.
Competitive equilibrium with lump-sum taxes, (Tθ)θ=H,L, is deﬁned
analogously to the tax-free competitive equilibrium of Deﬁnition 1: A price-
allocation pair will be an equilibrium if agents optimize, now subject to (17),
andmarketsclear. Inaddition,thegovernmentmustbreakeveninequilibrium,
i.e., taxes, (Tθ)θ=H,L, must satisfy the government budget constraint
 
θ=H,L
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Efﬁcient Redistribution with Lump-Sum Taxation
Under Full Information
We will say that a lump-sum tax system, (Tθ)θ=H,L, implements a given allo-
cation, c,i fc is a competitive equilibrium allocation under taxes, (Tθ)θ=H,L.
The following result is a version of the classic sufﬁciency result known as the
Second Welfare Theorem.
Theorem 2 Every First Best Pareto optimum, c∗, can be implemented with a
lump-sum tax system, (Tθ)θ=H,L.
Under this theorem, lump-sum taxes are clearly sufﬁcient to achieve any
desired distribution of the total gains from trade available in this economy.
We will now provide a proof of this theorem constructed as follows. First,
we derive a set of sufﬁcient conditions for an allocation to be an equilibrium
allocation. Then, we show that for every First Best Pareto optimum c∗(γ),
γ ∈ [0,∞], lump-sum taxes, (Tθ)θ=H,L, can be set so c∗(γ) satisﬁes these
sufﬁcient conditions.
In order for an allocation, c, to be an equilibrium allocation, there must
exist a capital price, q, at which agents choose to consume c and the capital
trades associated with c clear the market. First, let us identify sufﬁcient
conditionsforagents’optimizationatagivenprice,q. Underthepresent-value
budget constraint (17), agents solve a strictly concave optimization problem.
Thus, the individual Euler equation (14) and the budget constraint (17) are
sufﬁcientforanallocation,c,tobeindividuallyoptimalattheprice,q. Second,
we need to check market clearing. However, as long as we implement a
resource-feasible allocation, c, the capital purchases associated with c will
clear the market.
OneofthepropertiesoftheFirstBestParetooptima(FBPO)isthattheyare
free of the so-called intertemporal wedges (see G08, Section 3). This means
thatateachFBPOc∗(γ)theintertemporalmarginalrateofsubstitution(IMRS)
ofeachagenttypeisequaltotheintertemporalmarginalrateoftransformation.














for each γ ∈ [0,∞]. This simple property is crucial for the implementation
of FBPO as competitive equilibria.
Let us denote the two agent types’ common IMRS value by m∗(γ).
Directly from (14) we see that if the price of capital is
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then the individual Euler equation holds for both agent types simultaneously.
Let us denote this price of capital by ˆ q(γ)for each γ ∈ [0,∞].
All that remains to be checked is affordability, i.e., that both types’budget
constraints are satisﬁed at the consumption allocation, c∗(γ), and price, ˆ q(γ).
For that, however, we have the lump-sum taxes, Tθ. In particular, we can ﬁnd
the lump-sum tax, TL, that will make the FBPO c∗
L(γ) affordable for agent L.
To do that, we solve the budget constraint
c∗
1L(γ) + c∗
2L(γ)ˆ q(γ)/y = y +ˆ q(γ)− TL (20)
for TL. For each γ ∈ [0,∞], we will denote this solution by TL(γ). Using
the formulas for c∗(γ) derived in G08, we can compute TL(γ) explicitly.





















From the Euler equation (14), we therefore have that if c∗(γ) is to be an





Substituting this price and the consumption values (21) and (22) into (20), we











It is easy to verify that with tax TH(γ), the FBPO c∗
H(γ) is affordable to agent
H underthecapitalprice ˆ q(γ). Thus,foranyγ ∈ [0,∞]withtaxesT(γ),the
optimal allocation c∗
H(γ) satisﬁes sufﬁcient conditions for equilibrium. Proof
of Theorem 2 is therefore complete.
Equilibrium with lump-sum taxes, naturally, reduces to the pure competi-
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Figure 2 Agents’Problems’Solutions at Competitive Equilibrium with










From (23) and (24), it is easy to see that TH(1
3) = TL(1
3) = 0. Thus, zero
taxes are optimal with γ = 1
3, which exactly replicates the result we obtained
in the constructive proof of Theorem 1. When γ = 0, i.e., when the society
puts zero weight on welfare of the type H, the lump-sum tax on agents H is
TH(0) = 2, i.e., allwealthistakenawayfromagentsH. Attheotherextreme,
TH(∞) =− 2, i.e., the government transfers all wealth to agents H when
γ =∞ .
Figure 2 depicts the solution to the agents’utility maximization problems
at the equilibrium implementing the utilitarian optimal allocation (i.e., when
all agents receive the same welfare weight in the social planning problem).
With γ = 1, we have TH(1) =− 2
3 and TL(1) = 2
3. The equilibrium price is
ˆ q(1) = 1
3. Atthisprice, theex-dividendvalueofeachagent’scapitalinperiod
1i s1
3. The after-tax wealth of type H, thus, is y +ˆ q(γ)−TH = 2, while that
of type L is y +ˆ q(γ)− TL = 2
3. The budget constraint for type L, therefore,252 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
is




and the optimal choice is ˆ cL = (1
3,1). The H type faces the budget constraint
c1 + c2/3 = 2,
and his optimal choice is ˆ cH = (5
3,1). Figure 2 depicts these budget con-
straints and optimal choices along with two indifference curves representing
the maximal utility levels attained by each type in equilibrium with lump-sum
taxes (TH(1),TL(1)). The pale, horizontal, solid line represents the lump-
sum tax on the patient types TL(1) = 2
3. The pale, horizontal, dashed line
represents the lump-sum transfer to the impatient type, i.e., the negative of
the tax TH(1) =− 2
3. Under these transfers and the capital price ˆ q(1) = 1
3,
the two types’ budget constraints are parallel, with the budget line of type L
beingstrictlyinside(closertotheorigin)thebudgetoftypeH. Agentschoose
ˆ aH =ˆ aL = 0.
Withcompleteinformationaboutagents’types,thegovernmentcanfreely
redistribute wealth among the two types of agents. With a competitive market
for capital, no further government intervention is needed for either efﬁciency
or distributional reasons. Nondistortionary lump-sum taxes are sufﬁcient to
efﬁciently attain any distributional objective of the government, i.e., they im-
plement any First Best Pareto-optimal allocation of consumption.
Inefﬁcacy of Lump-Sum Taxes Under Incomplete
Public Information
Suppose now that the government cannot directly observe agents’types. Can
the government implement a wealth transfer from one type to the other when
it does not see which agents are of which type? Certainly the lump-sum tax
system described above cannot be used because it requires the knowledge
of agents’ types. Potentially, the government could elicit this information
from the agents. However, if the government uses this information to simply
transfer wealth, agents will not reveal their type truthfully.
This is very intuitive. The larger an agent’s after-tax wealth, the better
off this agent will be in any competitive equilibrium. With agents themselves
being the only source of information about their preference types, any lump-
sum tax with TH  = TL will make some agents lie about their type. Clearly, if
TH <T L, everybody will declare themselves to be of type H.I f TL <T H,
everybody will say they are of type L. Therefore, if the government sets
lump-sum taxes TH  = TL, all agents will end up paying min{TH,T L}, i.e., all
agentswillpaythesameamount. Giventhegovernmentbudgetconstraint,this
amount must be zero. Thus, when agents’types are their private information,
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TH = TL = 0. We see that if the government wants to (or is restricted
to) use lump-sum taxes to redistribute social surplus and agents have private
information, the government can redistribute nothing.
It is worth emphasizing that the competitive equilibrium allocation re-
mains efﬁcient in our economy even when agents have private information
about their type, i.e., the First Welfare Theorem holds in our economy with
private information. An easy way to see that this indeed is the case is simply
to check that the competitive equilibrium allocation, ˆ c, given in (15)–(16) be-
longstothesetofSecondBestPareto-optimalallocationscharacterizedinG08
(see Figure 4 in particular). In fact, this is quite intuitive. Private information
does not interfere with the price mechanism in our model because it does not
affect the nature of the commodity that is being traded. Under both complete
and private information about agents’preferences, consumption is traded for
capital. Preferences of buyers and sellers do not affect the nature of this trade
beyond what is captured by agents’demand functions. The competitive price
mechanism is thus efﬁcient.13
In sum, competitive equilibrium delivers one efﬁcient allocation in our
economy—under both complete and incomplete public information. This
allocation represents a particular distribution of the gains from trade among
the two types of agents. Thus, competitive equilibrium is suboptimal under
almost all possible strictly Paretian social preference orderings (represented
by the parameter γ ∈ [0,∞]).14 In the case of complete public information,
this distributional problem can be remedied by lump-sum taxes. In the case of
private information, however, lump-sum taxes are powerless. In fact, in our
economy, the only implementable lump-sum tax is the zero tax on all agents.
Motivated by this, we now turn to distortionary taxes.
5. COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM WITH DISTORTIONARY
TAXES
For the remainder of this article, we assume that information available to the
government is incomplete. In particular, agents’ impatience is known only
to them. We assume that the government knows the population distribution
of the impatience parameter, θ, but cannot determine the value of θ on an
agent-by-agent basis. Thus, tax systems in which the amount levied on an
agent depends directly on the agent’s θ are not feasible to the government.
13 In particlular, the classic lemons problem of Akerlof (1970) does not appear in this market.
14 One could also consider non-Paretian social preference orderings (see Mas-Colell,
Whinston, and Green [1995], Section 22.C). By considering only strictly Paretian social welfare
functions (of the form αuH + (1 − α)uL, where uθ = θu(c1θ) + βu(c2θ) for θ = H,L) we pose
a reasonably strong restriction on the set of allocations that can be considered optimal. In this
restricted set, almost all Second Best Pareto-optimal allocations cannot be supported by competitive
equilibrium with lump-sum taxes.254 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Let us start by deﬁning a general class of feasible tax systems. For dates
t = 1,2, let Tt denote the mapping from agents’publicly observable charac-
teristics at t to the tax payments to the government at t. In the ﬁrst period,
agents trade current consumption for capital. These trades are observable to
the government. Thus, T1(c1,a)represents the amount of tax due at the end
of date one. At the end of the second date, second-period consumption is also
publicly available, so T2(c1,a,c 2) is the second-period tax function. Clearly,
the government can use any tax system of this form because the amounts
due from each agent depend only on what the government can observe. In
particular, T1 and T2 do not depend on the unobservable parameter θ.
Under a tax system (T1,T2), agents’budget constraints are given by
c1 + qa = y − T1(c1,a),
c2 = (1 + a)y − T2(c1,a,c 2).
Competitive equilibrium is deﬁned, again, analogously to Deﬁnition 1:
agents optimize, markets clear, and government budget constraints are satis-
ﬁed. With taxes (T1,T2), these constraints are given by
 
θ=H,L
μθT1(ˆ c1θ, ˆ aθ) = 0, (25)
 
θ=H,L
μθT2(ˆ c1θ, ˆ aθ, ˆ c2θ) = 0, (26)
where ˆ ctθ and ˆ aθ are equilibrium values of agents’ consumption and capital
trades.
Note that any nonzero feasible tax system (T1,T2) will be distortionary.
Indeed, if a tax system (T1,T2) is not distortionary, then T1 and T2 must be
constant(independentoftheirarguments). Inthiscase,thegovernmentbudget
constraints (25) and (26) imply immediately that T1 = T2 = 0.
Since agents’actions, but not types, are observable, it is clear that redis-
tribution can be achieved only with taxes that depend on agents’ actions and
not types. However, it is not obvious what form these taxes should take in
order to be effective. The next subsection provides an example of a simple
distortionary tax system that is feasible but completely ineffective for imple-
mentation of redistribution.
A Simple Distortionary Tax System
In this subsection, we examine a simple tax system with a proportional tax on
capital income. In this system, capital income in period t is taxed at a ﬂat rate
τt ∈ [0,1] and the proceeds are refunded to the agents as a lump-sum transferB. Grochulski: Redistributive Taxation 255
Tt.15 In our general notation, this tax system is written as
T1(c1,a) = τ1y − T1,
T2(c1,a,c 2) = τ2(1 + a)y − T2.
A tax system of this form consists of four numbers, (τt,T t)t=1,2. Setting
τt = Tt = 0 for t = 1,2 gives us the competitive equilibrium outcome, i.e.,
the equilibrium allocation is a Pareto optimum with the relative weight of the
high type equal to γ CE = 1
3. We want to study what other efﬁcient allocations
can be achieved in this economy with a tax system of the form (τt,T t)t=1,2.
The answer turns out to be: none.
Under taxes, (τt,T t)t=1,2, agents’budget constraints are given by
c1 + qa = y(1 − τ1) + T1,
c2 = (1 + a)y(1 − τ2) + T2,




μθτ2(1 +ˆ aθ)y = T2.
Because of agents’ equilibrium choices ˆ aθ satisfy capital market clearing  
θ=H,Lμθ ˆ aθ = 0, the second-period government budget constraint reduces
to





Thus, in both periods the amount the government refunds to each agent must
equal the marginal capital income tax rate times the economy’s aggregate
amount of capital income, which in our model is ﬁxed at Y = y.
Using τ1y = T1, the agents’budget constraint in the ﬁrst period reduces
to
c1 + qa = (1 − τ1)y + τ1y
= y.
Thus,theﬁrst-periodtaxoncapitalincomehasnoeffectontheagents’budgets,
as every agent has the same capital income and receives the same lump-sum
refund equal to the average capital income tax.
15 Proportional distortionary taxes have been extensively studied in a vast literature initiated
by Ramsey (1927). That literature concentrates on the question of minimization of the distortions
resulting from proportional taxes, without addressing the question of optimal taxation. In particu-
lar, that literature does not consider situations in which distortionary taxes may have a corrective
function, e.g., in economies with externalities or private information.256 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
In the second period, using τ2y = T2, we can simplify the budget con-
straint as follows
c2 = (1 + a)y(1 − τ2) + T2
= (1 + a)y(1 − τ2) + τ2y
= (1 + (1 − τ2)a)y.
We see that the lump-sum refunded ﬂat tax on capital income, τ2 > 0, acts
simplyasatransferfromthosewhobuycapital(a>0)tothosewhosellit(a<
0). If τ2 < 1, this transfer is proportional to the amount of capital traded.16
We note here that in a regular capital market transaction the payment that the
buyer makes to the seller is a transfer of the exact same form. In particular,
the tax payment, τ2a, just like a price payment, is proportional to the amount,
a, of capital being traded. From this observation, we see that a proportional
tax on capital, with τ2 < 1, does nothing but change the equilibrium price of
capital. In particular, under any tax of this form, equilibrium allocation will
coincide with the competitive equilibrium allocation, ˆ c, so no redistribution
can be achieved.
To see this point more clearly, let us write the agents’budget constraints
again in the present-value form. From the ﬁrst-period budget constraint we
have that a = (y −c1)/q. Substituting into the budget constraint at date two,
we obtain
c2 = (1 + (1 − τ2)(y − c1)/q)y,








Let us now denote q/(1 − τ2) by Q. This value represents the tax-adjusted
priceofcapital. Foranytaxrateτ2 < 1,wecanwritethepresent-valuebudget
constraint as
c1 + c2Q/y = Q + y,
which is the same expression as the budget constraint agents face in the model
without taxes, but with the price of capital, q, replaced with the tax-adjusted
price, Q. The solutions to these two models must therefore be the same, i.e.,
ˆ Q = 1
2. Thus, underaproportionalcapitaltax, theequilibriumpriceofcapital
is ˆ q = (1 − τ2)/2 and the unique equilibrium allocation is ˆ c for any tax rate,
τ2 < 1.
This result is intuitive. Absent taxes,
q
y is the price of one unit of c2 in
terms of c1. With tax, τ2, on capital purchases, a, in order to obtain one extra
16 If τ2 = 1, the government taxes the proceeds from the sale of capital at the rate of 100
percent. Under this tax, the market for capital is shut down, the tax proceeds are zero, and the
only equilibrium is autarchy, which is not an efﬁcient allocation in this economy.B. Grochulski: Redistributive Taxation 257
unit of c2, an agent must purchase 1/(1 − τ2)y units of capital at date one.
With the price of capital being q, this means that it takes q/(1 − τ2)y units
of c1 to purchase one unit of c2. The beneﬁt of selling capital in period 1 is
symmetrically increased, as selling capital now not only brings in resources
for consumption today but also saves capital income taxes tomorrow. By
affectingbothsidesofacapitaltransactionsymmetrically,thetax,τ2,changes
the nominal price of capital but does not change the real tradeoff that agents
face in equilibrium.
Settingasidethecaseofcompletemarketshutdown, weseethatnodistor-
tionary tax system of the form (τ,T) can affect the competitive equilibrium
outcome. For any marginal tax rate, τ2 < 1, the equilibrium allocation is
the same as it is for τ2 = 0. In the next section, we consider distortionary
tax systems capable of changing the equilibrium outcome and implementing
other efﬁcient allocations.
6. EFFICIENT REDISTRIBUTION WITH DISTORTIONARY
TAXATION UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
Inthissection,wedeviseaclassoftaxsystemsthatarefeasibledespiteagents’
private information and capable of implementing any Second Best Pareto-
optimal allocation. Similar to the simple system (τ,T) considered in the
previous section, we will have a distortionary tax on capital and a lump-sum
component. However, the distortion will not affect both parties to a capital
sale/purchase transaction symmetrically.
An Optimal Distortionary Tax System
The tax system we consider in this section consists of two parts. First, there
is a lump-sum tax, Tt, levied on all agents in period t = 1,2. Second, there
are subsidies to sufﬁciently extreme capital trades. The form these subsidies
take is as follows. The government sets a (negative) threshold, a, and pays a
subsidy, S
−
1 , in period 1 to all agents whose capital purchases are not greater
than a (i.e., a subsidy to all who sell a sufﬁciently large quantity of capital).
Alternatively, the government can set a threshold, a, and pay a subsidy, S
+
2 ,
in period 2 to all agents whose capital purchases are not smaller than a (i.e.,
a subsidy to those who buy a lot of capital). In the tax system implementing







2 ,a). In the general notation introduced in the previous section, we can
express this tax system as follows:
T1(c1,a) = T1 − Ia(a)S
−
1 , (27)
T2(c1,a,c 2) = T2 − Ia(a)S
+
2 , (28)258 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
where Ia and Ia are indicator functions given by
Ia(a) =
 





1i fa ≥ a,
0 otherwise.
We restrict attention to this class of tax systems because, as we will show,
taxes in this class are sufﬁcient for implementation of all Second Best Pareto-
optimal allocations. In the next section, we discuss the possibility of imple-
menting Second Best Pareto optima with other tax mechanisms.
Clearly, since taxes (27)–(28) do not depend on the unobservable param-
eter θ, agents of both types face the same budget constraint, which is given
by
c1 + qa ≤ y − T1 + Ia(a)S
−
1 ,
c2 ≤ (1 + a)y − T2 + Ia(a)S
+
2 .
















2 ,a) consists of a consumption allocation, ˆ c = (ˆ c1H, ˆ c1L, ˆ c2H, ˆ c2L);
capital trades, ˆ a = (ˆ aH, ˆ aL); and a capital price, ˆ q, such that (i) agents opti-
mize, i.e., theequilibriumallocationmaximizesagents’utilitygiventheprice,
ˆ q,andtaxes,T ;(ii)thecapitalmarketclears;and(iii)thegovernment’sbudget
is balanced in every period. As before, we will say that the tax system, T , im-
plements a Second Best Pareto optimum, c∗∗(γ), if there exists a competitive
equilibrium such that ˆ c = c∗∗(γ).
Analogous to (19), let m∗∗
θ (γ) denote the intertemporal marginal rate of









The following result is a version of the Second Welfare Theorem with private
information.
Theorem 3 Every Second Best Pareto optimum c∗∗ can be implemented as
a competitive equilibrium with taxes, T . In particular, for γ ∈ [0,∞], the
Second Best Pareto optimum c∗∗(γ) is implemented by the tax system
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given as follows.
For γ<γ CE :
T1(γ) = S
−
1 (γ) = a(γ) = 0,
T2(γ) = Y − c∗∗
2H(γ) + m∗∗







2 (γ) = c∗∗
2L(γ) − c∗∗
2H(γ) + m∗∗















For γ ≥ γ CE :
T2(γ) = S
+
2 (γ) = a(γ) = 0,




















a(γ) = Y −1(c∗∗
2H(γ) − Y).
Although the expressions for the thresholds and transfers speciﬁed in the
tax system, T (γ), look complicated, the intuition behind them is very simple.
Absenttaxes,aswehaveseen,thecompetitivemarketmechanismimplements
theefﬁcientallocationc∗∗(γ CE). Inordertoimplementanoptimumc∗∗(γ)for
someγ>γ CE, thegovernmentmustredistributefromthepatienttypes, L,t o
the impatient types, H, (recall that γ is the relative weight that the impatient
type, H, receives in the social welfare objective). How can this redistribution
be achieved when the government cannot observe agents’types?
In competitive equilibrium without taxes, the impatient types sell capital
because of their strong preference for ﬁrst-period consumption. The patient
types buy it. Thus, the government knows ex post who the impatient and pa-
tient agents are simply by looking at agents’capital trades. Suppose then that
the government, targeting the impatient agents, gives a small subsidy to those
whosellasufﬁcientlylargequantityofcapital. Ifthesubsidyissmallenough,
or the minimum sale size requirement is sufﬁciently large, this subsidy will
not cause the patient agents to change their behavior (i.e., to ﬂip from buying
to selling capital).17 Under such a subsidy, patient agents still buy capital and,
therefore, do not collect the subsidy. The impatient agents, who were selling
capital even without the subsidy, continue to sell it, which now gives them the
additional beneﬁt of the subsidy. Thus, the subsidy reaches the targeted type.
If this subsidy is funded by lump-sum taxes on all agents, it redistributes from
the patient agents to the impatient ones, as intended. The optimal tax mech-
anism, T (γ), delivers the subsidy to the targeted type precisely in this way.
For any γ>γ CE, the optimal tax system, T (γ), provides a threshold level,
a(γ), and a subsidy level, S
−
1 (γ), that achieve in equilibrium the amount of
17 In the language of mechanism design, the market mechanism distorted by such a subsidy
remains incentive compatible.260 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
redistribution (relative to the competitive market allocation) required to im-
plement the optimal allocation, c∗∗(γ).
Similarly, in order to implement the optimum c∗∗(γ) for some γ<γ CE,
the government redistributes from the impatient types, H, to the patient types,
L. Taxes, T (γ), are again designed to not induce the agents to ﬂip, so the
impatient types continue to sell capital and the patient types continue to buy
it. For γ<γ CE, the lump-sum-funded subsidy, S
+
2 (γ), goes to the buyers
of capital, that is types L, and thus reaches the targeted type of agent. In this
way, tax T (γ) achieves the desired redistribution.
Let us now argue slightly more formally that this intuition is consistent
with equilibrium. We need to demonstrate that conditions (i)–(iii) deﬁning
competitive equilibrium with taxes are satisﬁed under taxes, T (γ), with con-
sumption, ˆ c = c∗∗(γ),alongwithsomeprices, ˆ q(γ),andcapitaltrades, ˆ aθ(γ).
More precisely, we will argue that equilibrium capital price, ˆ q(γ), can be ob-
tained from the IMRS of the agents who do not receive the subsidy to capital
sales/purchases. For γ>γ CE, these are the patient agents, i.e.,
ˆ q(γ) = m∗∗
L (γ)y (29)
for these γ.F o rγ<γ CE, the impatient types do not receive the subsidy, thus
ˆ q(γ) = m∗∗
H (γ)y
for all γ in this range. The subsidy threshold levels a(γ) and a(γ) are such
thatthefollowingcapitaltradesareoptimalintheagents’utilitymaximization
problem:










ˆ aL(γ) = a(γ)
for each γ<γ CE.
Checking that equilibrium conditions (ii) and (iii) are satisﬁed amounts
to a bit of simple algebra. The crux of the argument is in checking the ﬁrst
equilibrium condition, i.e., in showing that under taxes, T (γ), and proposed
equilibrium prices, ˆ q(γ), agents of types H and L indeed ﬁnd it optimal to
choosetheproposedequilibriumcapitaltrades ˆ aH(γ)and ˆ aL(γ),respectively.
An algebraic proof of this result would be very tedious. In particular, note
that the algebraic argument we used in the case of lump-sum taxes with full
information cannot be used here, as the Euler equations are invalid due to the
budget line being given by a non-differentiable function.
We will thus proceed differently. For several selected values of γ, we will
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agents’individualutilitymaximizationundertaxes,T (γ). Qualitatively,these
values will be representative of the whole spectrum of γ. From our graphical
argument, it will be clear that the conclusion holds for all γ ∈ [0,∞].
Considerthecaseofγ = 1(whichrepresentstheutilitariansocialwelfare
objective). Since1 >γCE = 1
3, wehavethatthetaxsystem, T (1), providesa
subsidy, S
−
1 (1), to agents whose capital purchases, a, are not larger than a(1).
From the closed-form expression for c∗∗(1) given in equations (21)–(22) of
G08, we have that the optimal utilitarian allocation has c∗∗




L (1) = (1
2, 3
2). Substituting these values into the formula for tax parameters
T (1) given in the statement of Theorem 3, we have
T2(γ) = S
+
















Under the tax system, T (1), therefore, agents who sell at least half of their
initial capital stock receive the subsidy of 2
3 units of consumption at date one.
There is no subsidy to buying assets. All agents pay the lump-sum tax of 1
3 at





The thick crooked line in Figure 3 represents the budget constraint that
all agents face in their utility maximization problem under taxes, T (1), and
price, ˆ q(1). The horizontal segment of this budget constraint results from
the subsidy, S
−
1 (1). The horizontal dashed line represents the lump-sum tax,
T1. The two convex curves in Figure 3 are the highest indifference curves
that types H and L attain in their utility maximization problems under taxes,
T (1), and price, ˆ q(1). The indifference curve of type H has exactly one
point in common with the budget constraint, c∗∗
H (1) = (3
2, 1
2). The impatient
agents, therefore, maximize their utility by choosing the consumption pair
c∗∗
H (1), which is consistent with implementation of the Second Best Pareto
optimum c∗∗(1). The indifference curve of type L meets the budget constraint
at two points: c∗∗
L (1) = (1
2, 3
2) and c∗∗
H (1) = (3
2, 1
2). Thus, c∗∗
L (1) is consistent
with the individual utility maximization of the L types, as well, however not
uniquely.18
18 That this individual optimum is not unique is necessary in the implementation of the
optimum c∗∗(1) because the incentive compatibility constraint of type L, (6), binds at c∗∗(1).262 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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2) than the downward-slopping segment of the budget constraint at this




of the H type at c∗∗
H (1) is −m∗∗
H (1)−1. Because of the intertemporal wedge
prevailing at the optimal allocation c∗∗(1), these two rates are not equal. In
fact, the sloping segment of the budget line is strictly steeper than the indif-
ference curve of the H type at c∗∗




Non-uniqueness for at least one type of agent will appear in any implementation of any Second
Best Pareto optimum at which at least one of the incentive compatibility constraints (5) (6) is
binding.B. Grochulski: Redistributive Taxation 263
a(1) =− 1
2. Given the intertemporal wedge, which implies that the H type is
savings-constrained,alowerthresholda(1)wouldprovideasmallerdistortion
and beneﬁt the H types. It would, however, also beneﬁt the L-type agents,
causing them to change their behavior from buying capital and receiving no
subsidy to selling capital and qualifying for the subsidy, which would make
this tax mechanism miss its subsidy target. For that reason, the H-type agents
must remain savings-constrained in equilibrium.
That the same construction of equilibrium holds for all γ>γ CE can be
easilycheckedusingtheexpressionsfortaxes,T (γ),providedinthestatement
of Theorem 3 and prices, ˆ q(γ), given in (29). One difference appears when
we consider the Second Best Pareto optima c∗∗(γ) for the values of γ for
which the incentive constraints do not bind.19 When no incentive constraints
bind, the consumption bundle c∗∗
θ (γ) is a unique maximizer in the individual
utility maximization problems of both types θ = H,L. The slope of the
non-horizontal segment of the budget line at c∗∗
H (γ) is equal to the slope of
the indifference curve of the H type at this point; the allocation is free of
intertemporal wedges. This means that agents of type H would not beneﬁt
by selling slightly fewer claims than a(γ) even if the subsidy, S
−
1 (γ), were
availableataslightlylowerthreshold. Inthissense, thethreshold, a(γ), isnot
uniquely pinned down by the optimum c∗∗(γ) for these values of γ. Figure 4
depicts this construction for one such value, namely γ = 0.4.
Let us now turn to the Second Best Pareto optimum c∗∗(0), i.e., the worst
among all Second Best Pareto-optimal allocations from the point of view of
the agents of type H. In order to implement this outcome, the government
subsidizescapitalpurchases. Calculatingtaxes,T (0),fromtheformulasgiven
in Theorem 3, and pinning down capital price from the IMRS of the agents
of type H (who do not receive the subsidy in equilibrium), we construct the
budget constraint depicted in Figure 5. The vertical segment of the budget
constraint represents the subsidy, S
+
2 (0). The dashed vertical line represents




maximal indifference curve of the agents of type L touches the budget line
only at c∗∗
L (0). Within this budget set, therefore, both types of agents choose
to consume their part of the optimal allocation, c∗∗(0). In this way, the tax
system, T (0), implements the Second Best Pareto optimum c∗∗(0).
As before, this construction generalizes for all γ<γ CE. For those γ for
whichtheincentiveconstraintoftheH typedoesnotbind,bothtypes’optimal
consumption, c∗∗
θ (γ), is the unique maximizer of individual utility under the
budget constraints obtained from the equilibrium price, ˆ q(γ) = m∗∗
H (γ)y,
19As shown in G08, this is the case for γ in the interval [γCE,γ2], where γ2 is the
threshold value at which the incentive constraint for the L type begins to bind.264 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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and taxes, T (γ). In those cases, as well, the optimal threshold, a(γ), is not
uniquely determined by the optimum c∗∗(γ).
From the above graphical constructions, we can see how the implemen-
tation argument extends to all values of γ ∈ [0,∞].
7. OTHER TAX MECHANISMS
In this section, we brieﬂy discuss the question of the uniqueness of the tax
system, T (γ). The tax system, T (γ), is by no means a unique tax system
capable of implementation of Second Best Pareto optima.
Consideranarbitraryfeasibletaxsystem,T ,anddenotebyB(T )thesetof
allconsumptionpairs(c1,c 2)thatarebudget-feasibleintheagents’individual
utility maximization problem under taxes, T . Suppose that (a) B(T ) contains
the consumption pairs c∗∗
H (γ) and c∗∗
L (γ), and (b) B(T ) is contained in theB. Grochulski: Redistributive Taxation 265
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lower envelope of the indifference curves of the agents of type θ traced from
the optimal consumption bundles c∗∗
θ (γ). It can easily be seen in Figures 3,
4, and 5 that any tax system, T , that satisﬁes (a) and (b) does implement the
optimum c∗∗(γ). This point goes back to Mirrlees (1971).
Nevertheless,thetaxsystem,T (γ),usedinTheorem3hasseveralfeatures
thatmaybeappealing(onthebasisofout-of-modelconsiderations, however).
First, it is simple. Second, it does not crowd out the market completely. Let
us discuss these two points by comparing the tax system, T (γ), with two
alternatives.
As the ﬁrst alternative, consider a tax system in which the government
taxes away all private wealth by setting the lump-sum taxes T1 = T2 = y
and offers two government welfare programs, with each agent in the economy
being eligible to sign up for at most one. The ﬁrst welfare program hands
out consumption c∗∗
H (γ) to each agent who signs up for it. The second hands266 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
out c∗∗
L (γ).20 Clearly, this system can implement any Second Best Pareto
optimum c∗∗(γ), as well as any resource feasible and incentive compatible
allocation. But it may be considered unappealing. Under this tax mechanism,
themarketiscompletelyshutdown: Anticipatingthelump-sumtax,T2,agents
hold on to their capital and just consume the government handout. All trade is
crowdedoutbythecombinationofhightaxesandgenerouswelfareprograms.
All transfers in this economy go through the hands of the government. The
tax system, T (γ), of the previous section is comparatively appealing because
it calls for a much smaller government intervention in the market economy.
Only a part of the transfers needed to support Pareto-optimal allocations go
through the hands of the government, with private markets having a clear role.
Another possible tax system is one under which the budget constraint,
B(T ), is exactly equal to the lower envelope of the indifference curves traced
from the optimal consumption, c∗∗
θ (γ), of the two types of agents. At this
system, the size of the transfers going through the government’s hands is
minimal. This system, however, is complicated because a high degree of
nonlinearity in the implicit tax rates is required to trace out the nonlinear
indifference curves of the two types. By comparison, the system, T (γ),i s
simple, with the budget constraint being given by a linear schedule with just







argument against distortionary government interventions. Market allocations
areefﬁcientandallsocietalneedsforredistributioncanbeefﬁcientlyachieved
with lump-sum taxes and transfers. There is no reason to use distortionary
taxes in the classical general equilibrium model. From the vantage point of
theclassicaltheory,distortionarytaxes,whichinfactareusedbygovernments
in many countries, may appear to reﬂect a failure of government policy.
This appearance is overturned when one recognizes the strong infor-
mational requirements imposed by the classical general equilibrium theory.
Whengovernmentsdonotpossessufﬁcientlyﬁneinformationabouttheagents
populating the economy, general equilibrium analysis leads to a completely
different view of distortionary taxation. As our simple model illustrates,
with incomplete public information, governments must necessarily rely on
distortionary taxes in order to efﬁciently implement the desired level of
redistribution.
20 One can see that this tax mechanism is simply a version of the direct revelation mechanism
used to deﬁne the Social Planning Problem in G08.B. Grochulski: Redistributive Taxation 267
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